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Abstract 
The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) organization must secure the homeland by preventing illegal entry into the United 
States.  In order to successfully accomplish this task, a System of Systems (SoS) of airborne, ground, fixed, mobile, manned, and 
unmanned capabilities must act together in order to successfully accomplish the objective.  However, it may be difficult to 
identify a specific SoS configuration that will meet the objective and quantify the requirements allocated for each specific 
system.  This paper offers a methodology to evaluate the SoS phases to detect, track, identify, decide, act, and assess the actions 
of CBP forces.  This methodology is exercised to quantify the system contributions to the CBP SoS and the interfaces needed for 
each system. 
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System of Systems, System Methodologies 
1. Introduction 
Requirements are often the largest source of variability and unknown quantities at the start of traditional systems 
engineering projects.  From a System of Systems (SoS) perspective, increased difficulty is added with multiple 
systems and independently managed program offices whose efforts need to be coordinated in order to achieve the 
SoS objectives.  Without sufficient guidance, there will be a failure to adequately identify and allocate requirements 
to constituent systems for their respective program office to manage.  Our motivation for this paper is to develop a 
SoS requirements engineering (RE) process to quantify the requirements on constituent systems. 
2. Background 
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A literature search on existing and previous requirements engineering processes was conducted in order to 
evaluate SoS RE processes and allocations.  Also included in the literature search were the concepts of resiliency 
from a SoS perspective, in order to understand how these requirements may be allocated to constituent systems. 
Existing traditional systems engineering standards (ISO-15288 [1], IEEE-1220 [2], IEEE-1223 [3], and EIA-632 
[4]) were reviewed for requirements allocation techniques, but they contained no specific guidance on SoS 
requirements allocation processes. 
The literature of system resiliency was reviewed in order to evaluate their implications on SoS requirements 
allocation.  Madni and Jackson define a conceptual framework for resilience engineering, and identify several 
motivations for why resilience is needed in response to types of disruption: operational contingencies may cause 
systems to fail, natural disasters may cause disruption, terrorism or instability may influence system operational 
environments, and financial environment meltdowns may affect operations [5].   
Jackson develops architecture of system resilience, identifying capabilities and infrastructure as two components 
that could enable resilience [6].  He identifies the multiple-system dependence on outputs from the preceding system 
that may affect the SoS performance.  Outputs from an individual system may be uncertain and thus may cause an 
emergent (or unpredictable) output in the final outcome [6].  We may directly apply this to SoS in that a requirement 
levied upon one system could cause positive or negative repercussions to the following system and ultimately the 
SoS execution of a mission.   
Erol et al. examines four properties when evaluating system resilience: definition of the system boundary, 
identification of the specific components, examination of the component and element relationships, and definition of 
the system  environment interactions [7].  We may extend this analogy to SoS by replacing component with 
system, in order to examine how a SoS may behave by examining how SoS requirements may be affected.   
Pflanz explores the effect of resiliency on command and control architectures within his dissertation.  Within his 
exploration of several command and control examples, he models the system processes, information flows, and 
system interfaces in order to assess the system performance as it adjusts to disruptive events and performs system 
recovery [8].  We emulate his approach in utilizing our SoS architecture artifacts in order to describe the structure 
and evaluate initial requirements allocations to constituent systems.  These SoS outcomes may then serve as an 
indicator of whether our allocation was correct or not, and serves to identify particular system requirements that 
contribute to a satisfactory SoS performance. 
There are three notable examples of using architectures to describe SoS performance and behavior that relate to 
our topic.  The first example is the Department of Defense SoS Guide [9] that provides a framework in which to 
define the types of SoS, as well as addressing SoS requirements that begin with the understanding of individual 
systems and their needs.  The second example from Adams and Meyers [10] analyzes the US Navy carrier strike 
group as a SoS, comprised of dissimilar platforms working together to achieve a common objective, which is similar 
to our approach.  The final example from Schuck [11] is the description of a SoS to conduct surveillance and 
monitoring for national parks, extending the enterprise architecture into the activities, components, and information 
exchanged. 
3. Description of SoS RE Process 
We offer a three step approach to the SoS RE process in order to adequately capture and document the ability to 
allocate requirements to the system level.  The three main metrics with which we can measure SoS performance are: 
operational reach, system contributions to the SoS, and system-system interactions throughout the SoS.  The 
operational reach measures the effective range and extent of the SoS activities while it executes the mission, from 
start to finish.  The system contributions indicate the percentage of time that a particular system is active throughout 
the SoS mission (and also within which SoS phase it is active), indicating a critical system that may require 
redundancy in order to ensure the SoS mission is successfully executed.  The system-system interactions (also 
referred to as SoS network usage) are also calculated in order to identify the number of interactions that a system 
may require during the SoS mission.  This may provide insight into the required network performance for the entire 
SoS, and also identify which system requires interactions at a critical SoS phase. 
The three-step process is as follows:  Step 1 identifies the scope of the SoS to the relevant constituent systems in 
order to specify which systems will be analyzed.  Step 2 allocates SoS requirements to the systems in a three-part 
sub process.  Step 2a decomposes the SoS objective into distinct SoS phases of operations, and identifies the 
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relevant systems participating in each phase.  Step 2b identifies the frequency of use that each SoS phase is 
operating. Step 2c calculates the system-system interactions within each of the SoS phases through a series of 
adjacency matrices.  Step 3 assesses the SoS mission through an executable model of the SoS architecture artifacts 
in order to evaluate our three SoS metrics.   
 
4. Case Study of SoS RE Process 
This case study examines the Customs and Border Protection efforts to monitor and respond to border incidents 
as a SoS.  It is referred to as a SoS due to the multiple systems under its scope to perform the assigned mission that 
could be comprised of fixed and mobile surveillance sensors, manned and unmanned aircraft, and manned and 
unmanned ground vehicles to respond to border incursions [12].  This case study will utilize the SoS requirements 
allocation process in a predictive manner for a yet to be built SoS, where top-level requirements have not been fully 
developed and allocated.   
 
Step 1 - scope the case study to the immediate CBP assets. This is based on the CBP identification of three main 
operating environments: urban, rural, and remote, which are in increasing distance from the border point of interest. 
For the purpose of this case study, we will focus on the remote environment that may require several minutes to 
several hour response times.  Systems described in our border surveillance concept include a command and control 
unit, fixed surveillance towers, communications towers, patrolling agents in vehicles, and patrolling agents on foot.  
The effects of a fixed and mobile surveillance source are also represented in the SoS analysis.  The target for this 
case study may be embarked in vehicles, horseback, or on foot, and can travel a direct or indirect path from an 
unknown starting region to various points on the border.   
Step 2 - allocate SoS requirements to constituent systems.  As SoS requirements are defined, individual system 
contributions and interfaces are identified in order to meet these SoS requirements.  The approach in this step is to 
decompose and quantify the SoS functions to the system level for each of the CBP SoS mission phases. This second 
step is further defined as follows. 
Step 2a  Decompose the main SoS objective into SoS phases: as the SoS executes its mission, there will be 
multiple phases that it will progress through towards completion.  We leverage the functional phase description by 
CBP in their Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) system development effort: detect/track, identify/classify, respond, and 
resolve [13].  We will utilize this functional flow to describe the CBP SoS activities as it performs its mission. 
Step 2b  Identify the frequency of usage of each SoS phase.  We develop an initial bounding scenario for the 
CBP SoS mission area to compute the frequency of each SoS phase duration.  In order to calculate this phase 
allocation, an example target path was initialized at the beginning of the scenario, with surveillance towers 
performing the initial detection / tracking, and then conducting classification / identification functions.  At this point, 
vehicles are sent to intercept the target during the response phase.  When the target is intercepted, the resolve phase 
and the scenario come to an end.  Within an example setup for a starting target range of 30 NM, target speed of 15 
mph, tower surveillance sensor range of 30 NM, intercept vehicle location located at the border with a 15 mph 
intercept speed, we can calculate our SoS phases as:  detect/track: 57%, identify/classify: 36%, respond: 24%, 
resolve: 10%.  These example phase allocations are intuitive since the majority of a surveillance problem is spent 
during the detection and identification phases in order to surveil a large area of territory surrounding the defended 
area. 
Step 2c - Calculate system-system interactions within each of the SoS phases.  We now need to identify the 
different system-system interfaces within each of the SoS phases.   
Figure 1 provides a set of adjacency matrices for the CBP SoS example based on the functional description of the 
four SoS phases.  We generate these matrices in order to document the presence and direction of system-system 
interface within each of the SoS phases.  Directionality is important due to the possibility that each interface may not 
be bi-
matrices enter into the calculations to the SoS network usage, described in the following pages and contribute 
towards the development of Tables 3 and 4.  
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Fig. 1. CBP SoS adjacency matrices for the border surveillance mission area  
 
Step 3 - Assess the SoS requirements allocation among their constituent systems.  For the CBP SoS mission area, 
we calculate the SoS attributes and system-level requirements allocation process in addition to evaluating our 
hypotheses. 
The following factors were modified: surveillance tower sensor range, number of towers, number of patrol 
vehicles, and target speed.  Each factor was given three levels, resulting in 729 unique SoS configurations.  If the 
CBP SoS configuration could not intercept the threat prior to it reaching its objective, the SoS configuration was 
considered to fail to perform the CBP mission.  Table 1 provides the factors and levels for the border surveillance 
mission analysis.  These were notional values based on US Customs and Border Protection Integrated Fixed Tower 
statement of objective values and interviews with CBP subject matter experts familiar with related analysis 
problems.  The range of values were chosen to represent a variety of current and projected capabilities. 
 
Table 1. Full factorial setup for the border surveillance mission 
Factor Level Descriptive metric 
Surveillance tower sensor range 5, 15, 50 Measured in NM 
Number of surveillance towers 1, 3, 5 Measured in quantity 
Number of intercept vehicles 2, 4, 7 Measured in quantity 
Intercept vehicle speed 5, 15, 30 Measured in mph 
Target speed 5, 15, 30 Measured in mph 
Vehicle starting position 0, 15, 30 Measured in NM 
 
Within each of the configurations, a series of target routes were evaluated in order to represent the variability of 
the target starting and ending point and the CBP SoS was evaluated over the entire range of possible routes.  The 
target routes were calculated by the use of nine discrete starting and ending points, resulting in a total of 81 different 
trajectories that varied from a straight-line trajectory towards the objective to a cross-wise path.  The SoS mission is 
then executed in a time-stepped fashion, where the systems transit towards their objectives, and logical decision 
steps are evaluated to when the SoS phases may start and stop. 
The sequence of events during the mission execution starts with the movement of the target towards its objective.  
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The range from the surveillance towers to target are checked to determine when the SoS detect/track or 
classify/identify phases are started and stopped to transition to the next phase.  One the classify/identify phase is 
complete, the CBP vehicle heads towards the target in a direct intercept course during the response phase.  When the 
vehicle reaches the resolve range to the target, the scenario ends and the intercept point is recorded as a success.  If 
the target reaches its objective, the SoS run is considered a failure. 
Data in terms of final range of target to border, time of SoS phase duration, and number of system-system 
interactions are recorded for post-processing calculations.  When the scenario has completed (either ending in 
success or failure), the SoS metrics are calculated to determine the SoS operational reach, the percentage of system 
usage, and percentage of system exchange of data compared to the total interactions sent.  The full factorial is 
executed to each set of 81 target paths to evaluate how the SoS performs.  From the analysis, we may be able to 
identify the critical system attribute(s) that contribute to two metrics: SoS operational reach and the percentage of 
the 81 target paths that were successfully intercepted, which are provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Summary of critical factors in the CBP SoS mission area analysis  
SoS Operational Reach SoS Percentage Coverage 
Tower sensor range,  
Tower sensor range * Target speed,  
Tower sensor range * Vehicle speed, 
Target speed, 
Vehicle speed, 
Vehicle speed * Target speed 
Tower sensor range, 
Target speed, 
Vehicle speed, 
Tower sensor range * Target speed, 
Tower sensor range * Vehicle speed, 
Vehicle speed * Target speed, 
Vehicle start position 
 
The most significant factor(s) to influence the SoS operational reach are the Tower sensor range, which is to be 
expected as this factor drives the initiation of the SoS functions to intercept the inbound targets.  Note the longer 
sensor range may be representative of an airborne sensor stationed forward of the border.  The earlier the problem 
may be started for the CBP SoS, it is intuitive that the CBP SoS would achieve greater success.  However, other 
combinations of factors to include tower sensor range and intercept vehicle speeds also contribute to the SoS 
operational reach, which is intuitive since the earlier the intercept initiation and the faster the intercept vehicle, the 
greater the SoS operational reach.   
The most significant factor(s) to influence the SoS percentage coverage are the Tower sensor range, and is also 
expected as this factor initiates the SoS functions.  It was surprising to note that the number of towers and number of 
vehicles did not provide as large of a significant contribution to the coverage of the multiple target routes as 
expected.  This may lead to an evaluation of alternative requirements for the CBP to not invest heavily in a large 
vehicle interceptor force in order to provide sufficient coverage.   
Figure 2 provides an overall plot of all 59,049 number of SoS configurations from the entire full factorial.  The 
indicates the target start and stop points, and the green diamonds indicate the initiation of vehicles sent to intercept 
the target.  Table 3 provides a summary of network usage from the analysis, and Table 4 provides a summary of 
system contribution within the SoS.  These tables were a result of the evaluation of the full factorial of SoS 
configurations in order to identify the usage of network and system usage throughout each scenario run.  We utilize 
quartiles 1 through 3 in order to gain a sense of the most commonly occurring data points for network and system 
usage in order to provide insight into SoS requirements at the early systems engineering lifecycle stages.  The 
network usage counts the number of messages sent from each system, with the frequency of transmission dependent 
on the SoS phase.  During the detect/track phases, messages are transmitted every 12 seconds; identify/classify 
phase is every 6 seconds, respond phase is every 3 seconds, and resolve phase is every 6 seconds.  The intent is to 
provide a measure of realism of the frequency of messages sent during the high and low levels of intensity during a 
scenario.  The system usage table tracks the number of seconds (and overall percentage) of how active a particular 
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system was during the scenario.  In cases where the intercept vehicle is not cued due to lack of search and detection 
by the tower, it would accordingly provide a lower number, thus the reason why intercept vehicles were not active in 
every scenario.  The quartiles in the tables provide a sense of activity level when evaluating the more valuable 
systems within the SoS. 
The software to develop Figure 2 was MATLAB using a time-stepped simulation approach.  For the start of the 
scenario, the program would move all applicable players (e.g. targets and intercept vehicles), check if the ranges or 
detections of the target met the exit criteria of a SoS phase, and proceeded to the next phase.  For the detect/track 
phase, the range from the surveillance tower to target were checked, if it reached the identify/classify range, the 
intercept vehicle would move on a direct course towards the target until it reached the resolve range, where the 
scenario would end successful (indicated by a blue circle).  If the target remained undetected by the tower or 
intercept vehicle and reached its destination, it would be considered a SoS failure.  Figure 2 axes are in NM. 
Within Tables 3 and 4 are two underlying equations to develop the SoS metrics.  The system network usage (for 
each individual system) is calculated by dividing the sum of all applicable system-system interactions by the total 
number of system-system interactions of all systems.  This provides insight into how much a particular system 
requires interaction within the SoS.  The system usage (for each individual system) is calculated by summing the 
time in each SoS phase (in this case we use seconds as the unit of measure) the system was active during that phase.  
















Fig. 2. CBP Mission Operational Reach Summary 
Table 3. Summary of SoS network usage 
Network Usage Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 
Surveillance Tower 24 91 207 
Communication Tower 68 132 360 
Intercept Vehicle 0 113 265 
Command and Control Node 114 194 384 
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Table 4. Summary of SoS system usage 
System Usage Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 
Surveillance Tower 0.105 0.768 1 
Communication Tower 0.573 0.910 1 
Intercept Vehicle 0 0.232 0.750 
Command and Control Node 0.823 0.933 1 
 
We can make the following remarks from the network and system usage tables:  the surveillance towers are a 
required system that must operate for essentially the entire time of the scenario; which is expected since all action 
 sensor capability.  The communications tower is in use when the 
surveillance towers have an active detection and track on the inbound target, but are not active when there is no 
detection by the tower.  These trends are similar for evaluating the vehicle usage, where there cannot be an intercept 
if the target is not detected nor identified.  The command and control node is involved in most of the phases, so its 
usage is unsurprisingly high. 
The SoS Total Network Capacity can vary between 20  400 messages per platform, in either a successful or 
failed SoS configuration.  The SoS System Contribution requires that each individual system (surveillance towers, 
communication towers, intercept vehicle, and the command and control node) be present and available throughout 
the entire scenario, which may lead to future resilience / reliability requirements for these nodes to ensure continual 
operations and availability.   
5. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
This case study was intended to explore a developing SoS mission area with a large potential range of system 
level performance characteristics, which were then evaluated using the SoS requirements allocation and analysis 
method.  These results may be used to help shape requirements for future SoS configuration development.  Areas for 
further research with this case study may be to evaluate a larger surveillance area that may utilize multiple CBP SoS 
to evaluate future SoS capacities on a larger scale. Other areas of research may be to add a stochastic element in the 
SoS activities and logic processes during mission execution, where the SoS requirements would have a probabilistic 
range and confidence interval that may be allocated to the constituent systems during concept development. 
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